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Abstract
Worker selection is a significant and challenging issue in crowdsourcing systems.
Such selection is usually based on an assessment of the reputation of the individual workers participating in such systems. However, assessing the credibility
and adequacy of such calculated reputation is a real challenge. In this paper,
we propose an analytic model which leverages the values of the tasks completed,
the credibility of the evaluators of the results of the tasks and time of evaluation of the results of these tasks in order to calculate an accurate and credible
reputation rank of participating workers and fairness rank for evaluators. The
model has been implemented and experimentally validated.
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Introduction

Crowdsourcing involves receiving, incorporating and consolidating contributions
from a large crowd with varied levels of expertise[11]. Processes like building
artifacts, evaluating items, and executing tasks are some instances of crowdsourcing processes[9]. For instance, Amazon Mechanical Turk1 (MTurk) provides on-demand access to task forces for micro-tasks such as image recognition, language translation, etc. Several organizations including DARPA and
various world health and relief agencies are using platforms such as MTurk
and Ushahidi2 to crowd-source information through multiple channels, including SMS, email, Twitter and the Web in general.
To crowdsource a task, the task owners, also called the Requesters, submit
tasks which they need done to a crowdsourcing platform. Another group of
people, called workers, contribute to solving tasks; the result of solving a task
is also called the outcome. Requesters evaluate the outcomes and may reward
workers whose outcomes have been accepted[15]. The overall quality of the
outcome of a crowdsourced task depends on the quality of the workers and on
processes that govern the task creation, selection of workers, coordination of
subtasks including reviewing intermediary outcomes, aggregation of individual
contributions etc.
Reputation is a popular method for evaluation of the quality of workers
in existing crowdsourcing platforms[8]. Reputation is used as an indicator of
community-wide judgment on worker performance[10]. Existing techniques for
computing workers reputation can be categorized in two categories: outcome
based and user based approaches.
In outcome based approaches, worker reputation is determined based on
the analysis of the outcome task performed by the worker [8, 2]. For example,
the reputation of Wikipedia contributors is in general computed based on the
quality of the content produced by the contributors [8, 2, 1].
WikiTrust[1, 2] as an example of tools calculate reputation based on quality
of the contents, employs two reputation ranks, one for users and one for content.
The reputation of the user is build based on the quality of the changes she makes
in the content. If the change she made is preserved by consequent editors, she
will gain reputation otherwise she looses reputation. For the contents, if a
content is edited by a reputable user it gains reputation and if a low reputation
user edits a content, the content looses reputation.
In user based approaches, worker reputation is determined using feedbacks
received explicitly or implicitly from other community members [6, 12].
eBay reputation model[6] is an example of using user based feedbacks to
build the reputations. After any transaction in eBay, the seller and the buyer
can rate each other by +1(positive), 0 (neutral), -1 (negative) along with a line of
comment. Based on these evaluations, two reputations are built for every user,
one as a seller and another one as a buyer. eBay also has a ranking criteria that
give every seller 4 types of rank, each rank of value between 1 and 5, intended
to reflect the quality of services that the seller has provided to the buyer, such
as postage time or postage and handling charges. eBay uses a simple averaging
model to calculate reputation of the users. There are also some reputation
1 http://www.mturk.com
2 http://ushahidi.com/
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models which employ an adaptive averaging model for reputation calculation
[12].
In general, existing reputation approaches focus on certain aspects of quality control. To obtain a fine grain view of different quality aspects, several
parameters and metrics need to be considered. In addition, existing reputation
systems suffer from several problems, like lack of sufficient information, bias in
user interests or evaluator dishonesty [13, 3, 16]. Although several solutions
[6, 4, 20, 12, 14] addressing these issues are proposed, dealing with these issues,
in particular with malicious evaluators, is still a challenge.
Crowdsourcing systems usually experience malicious activities[13, 3]. The
evaluators (either requester, reviewer or crowd voters) may cast unfair votes on
the quality of the proposed outcome. Voters may support each other by casting
positive votes or attack by casting negative votes regardless of the quality of the
outcomes. Malicious manipulation of reputation can lead to inadequate worker
selection which directly affects the quality of the obtained contributions. Also,
such manipulation can harm community members, leaving them vulnerable to
deceptive evaluators. For example, in online markets like Amazon Mechanical Turk loosing reputation results in decreasing chance of getting further jobs,
possibly causing unfair loss of income. In both the existing crowdsourcing platforms, as well as in research prototypes, this issue is not fully addressed.
Finally, in existing crowdsourcing systems the trustworthiness of the workers
are evaluated and proposed as a reputation rank. On the other hand, the
evaluators are not assessed and there is no public rank to show how realistic
and fair are the votes casted by and evaluator. The public ranks force people to
be more realistic and responsible to keep their public profile and preserve their
chance to be chosen as potential evaluators in further jobs. For example suppose
that a list of reviewers are chosen to evaluate journal papers. If the impact of
the reviews of a reviewer are displayed on her profile to show how fairly she has
evaluated others, the reviewer will do the task with her best efforts, but if there
are no consequences related to unfair behavior, the reviewer may put less effort
and attention on the work.
In this paper, we address the problem of designing a comprehensive worker
reputation assessment framework encompassing a set of adaptive and extensible
algorithms which provides an informative and reliable evaluation of the reputation of the workers and fairness of evaluators and which adequately takes into
account the trustworthiness of the person who gives the feedback, the time of
evaluation and the values of the tasks completed. Our solution builds upon
results in user based reputation techniques and provides a more fine grained,
more reliable and extensible reputation framework.
The need to consider time of execution of the tasks is due to the fact that
the capabilities and trustworthiness of the workers may change in time. Thus,
the feedback received from a trustworthy evaluator who has recently had an
interaction with a worker is more dependable than a feedback received long
time ago from an evaluator with a low level of trustworthiness.
The value of the task performed will be referred as credit. The reputation
built by contributing in high credit tasks is more reliable than a reputation built
on processes with low credits [12].
In our setup, we employ a graph data model with workers and evaluators
represented as nodes, and edges connecting each evaluator with workers which
she has evaluated.
2

We propose a novel model for reputation management in crowdsourcing systems. In summary, the unique contributions of the paper are as follow:
• We propose a credibility model to show how fair evaluators are when evaluating contributions of workers. We establish a pairwise relation between
every evaluator and worker who have been in contact at least once. We call
this relation degree of fairness. We use majority consensus on the trustworthiness of the workers as an indicator for how close the evaluator’s
opinion is to community consensus. The bigger the difference between the
community and worker’s opinions is, the lower the degree of fairness of
the evaluator will be.
• We propose an analytic model for calculating reputation of the workers
in crowdsourcing systems. We define a pairwise trust rank between every
evaluator and worker who have been in contact at least once. The trust
rank is the aggregation of all evaluations received from evaluator on the
worker’s contributions in time. Then, we aggregate in community pairwise trust ranks from all evaluators to build a community wide reputation
for the worker. The reputation is supported by a weight reflecting how
reliable the calculated assessment of reputation is. We also leverage pairwise trust and degrees of fairness to calculate a rank called fairness rank
for every evaluator to show the fairness of evaluator when assessing other
community members.
• We develop an efficient and robust algorithm for computing such reputations. Our experimental results confirm that our model is robust against
unfair or inaccurate evaluations, to an extent surpassing two most commonly used existing methods (eBay and Pagerank).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow: In section 2 we formulate
the problem. In section 3 we calculate the pairwise degree of fairness. Section
4 proposes calculation of pairwise trust. We propose the model for calculating
reputations in section 5. Section 6 describes algorithmic model implementation
and presents evaluation experiments. Related work is studied in section 7. We
discuss the performance of our method and and conclude in section 8.

2
2.1

Problem Formulation
Assumptions, Definitions and Setup

In this section we articulate our assumptions and define the terms we use in
this study. We also propose a summary of human intuition pertaining to trust
and argue that such intuition is properly captured by our axioms. This shows
rationality of trust ranks as computed using methods which satisfy the axioms
we formulate.
Assumptions and Definitions
There are some terms used in this paper which may have different meanings in
different contexts where they might be used. For that reason we now specify
the intended meaning of these terms in the remainder of the paper.
3

An Evaluator is the person who assesses the quality of a worker’s contribution for a task. The role of an evaluator can be performed by several types of
participants: by the requester who submitted the task, or by other community
members such as workers or other requesters.
Such evaluation may be different from a requester to a worker, because their
roles and interests give them different slants. The workers usually evaluate the
intermediary results of the tasks while the decision on the quality of the final
result is made by the requester. Thus, the granularity of the work assessed by
workers and by requesters is different. The other difference comes from different
motivation. Requesters and workers have different incentives for contributing
to the evaluation process. Workers may participate in a crowdsourcing tasks to
gain money, points or reputation but the requesters are the people who need the
best final outcomes of the task at lowest cost. Even workers can be different in
terms of their overall expertise and their experience in the system. The impact
of these differences will be taken into account in a future refinement of our work;
since in this paper we want to introduce the fundamentals of our methodology,
we will simplify our framework by not distinguishing systematic differences in
evaluations provided by workers and requesters; however, the feasibility of such
refinements will be quite transparent.
Unfair evaluation in crowdsourcing systems is an evaluation which does
not adequately reflect the quality of the evaluated outcome, and it usually comes
from malicious alter motives. Its purposeful form is called an attack. An example
is when users who have lost their reputation due to deceptive behavior attempt
to boost their reputation by a Sybil attack. In such an attack they may create
a requester account and submit some tasks, do them as a worker and accept
them as a requester thus boosting their reputation1 . Unfair evaluation might
be motivated by various reasons. For example, workers may try to harm or
support other workers or some particular requesters. Requesters, on the other
hand, may evaluate contributions unfairly in order to avoid paying a fair fee for
the task done, or even to harm a particular worker. While we do not study the
inherent features of such attacks, we do experimentally demonstrate robustness
of our method in such attacks. Such robustness is due to the inherent adaptive
features of our aggregation methods.
Setup
Let us assume that a crowdsourcing system has N members. These members
may submit tasks, do tasks submitted by others or evaluate others’ contributions. Suppose that NW members have contributed to at least one crowdsourcing task. We call this group of members Workers and denote by W = {wj :
0 ≤ j ≤ NW }. We also assume that NR members have evaluated at least one
contribution in the system. We call this group, Evaluators and denote them by
R = {ri : 0 ≤ i ≤ NR }. Suppose that a worker wj has prepared a contribution and submitted it to the system. The ri , an evaluator, assesses the results
received form wj at time stamp k and sends this evaluation to a Reputation
Management Service (RMS); these evaluations will be taken into account for
determining reputation of wj . We denote this evaluation by eij (k) . We assume
that the eij (k) is a real number in a fixed range [0, M ], (M > 0). If eij (k) = M ,
1 http://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2010/10/be-top-mechanical-turk-worker-youneed.html
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Figure 2.1: The process of calculating reputations.
this means that ri has determined that the quality of performance of wj warrants full trust at time k for the specified job, while eij (k) = 0 means that the
quality of performance of wj warrants a complete distrust. We emphasize that
R and W are not necessarily disjoint sets i.e. there might be some workers
who have evaluated other’s contributions as well as some evaluators who have
contributed in crowdsourcing tasks. We just draw these sets on figure 2.1 as
disjoint to simplify visual representation of the model for easier understanding.
To introduce our axioms, calculations and definitions, we identify the sequence of all evaluations by ri of wj at all time instances k by a partial function
~sij = {(k, eij (k)) : k ∈ D(~sij )}. The domain D(~sij ) is the collection of all time
instances that contributions of Wj has been evaluated by Ri . For the simplicity,
if indices i and j are clear from the context, we drop them from the definition
of the function and say that for every k ∈ D(~s), ~s[k] = e(k).
Our strategy is to calculate the reputation of the workers in two steps, as
shown in figure 2.1. In the first step we calculate the trust of ri ∈ R in wj ∈ W
for all such pairs, as well as the degree of fairness of such trust. In the second step
we aggregate such pairwise trust assessments into reputation ranks of evaluated
workers.
We now formulate our axioms which capture intuition on trust; numerical
value of trust assessment we call the (trust rank ) and denote it by T .
Axiom 1 Strict Monotony: If s~1 and s~2 are two evaluation sequences with a
domain D, and if s~1 [k] ≥ s~2 [k] for all k ∈ D, then T (s~1 ) ≥ T (s~2 ). In addition,
if s~1 [k] 6= s~2 [k], then T (s~1 ) 6= T (s~2 ).
This axiom says that better evaluations should result in higher trust ranks. For
instance suppose that contributions of w1 has been evaluated by two evaluators
r1 and r2 in same time instances and the evaluation results she has received
from r1 always have been higher than results received form r2 . This axiom
states that the calculated trust rank for the relation between r1 and w1 should
be higher than trust rank of the relation between r2 and w1 .
Axiom 2 Averaging: If ~s is an evaluation sequence with a domain D, then
min(~s) ≤ T (~s) ≤ max(~s).
This axiom means that the calculated trust rank should be a form of average of
all evaluations included in the calculation of the trust rank. As with the usual
notions of average of a set of numbers, the trust rank as the aggregation of
5

evaluations in the time should always fall between the minimum and maximum
values received as evaluations for the relation between the evaluator and the
worker.
Axiom 3 Time Discounting: Let e and E be two positive numbers and 0 ≤
e < E ≤ M . Also suppose that s~1 and s~2 are two evaluation sequences such that
D(s~1 ) = D(s~2 )) = {1, 2}, defined as s~1 [1] = e, s~1 [2] = E and s~2 [1] = E, s~2 [2] =
~ ≥ T (s2).
~
e. Then T (s1)
Axiom 3 formalizes our intuition that older evaluations can not be more important than the recent ones. This axiom states that even when two sequences
contain same evaluation values, the trust rank calculated based on these sequences are not necessarily same and it depends on the time stamp of every
evaluation. In other words, from two evaluations with equal values, the recent
one should have a higher weight than the old one in the calculated trust rank.
The time stamp of evaluations in ~s may be too large, particularly when the
crowdsourcing system has been working for several years. To simplify including
the time stamp of evaluations into calculations, instead of using the time stamp
itself as in [12], we divide the system life time to some smaller time intervals
like days, weeks, months, quarters, etc and assign an incremental index to every
time interval starting from one. Then we use the index of the time interval in
which the evaluations happened as the time label of the evaluation and denote
it by ϑk . The ϑk is smaller than k and decreases complexities of including time
in calculations.
We also define a constant called q, (q ≥ 1); the value assigned to q determines
how fast the importance of a past evaluations decreases as the time progresses,
and is system dependant. Suppose that the “half life” of the importance of
evaluations in a system is t i.e. the importance of an evaluations after t intervals
decreases to a half of its original value. The constant q is then calculated using
the following equation:
q = 21/t
(2.1)
The reason will be clear from equation (4.1).

2.2

Example Scenario

Voting is one of the popular crowdsourcing tasks[22]. In this kind of tasks, the
opinions of the crowd are collected to help requesters making better decisions.
In Wikipedia2 , the voting process is used to elect administrators. Every registered user can nominate herself or another user for being an administrator in
Wikipedia and initiate and election. The other users participate in the election and cast their votes on the eligibility of nominee to be an administrator
in the Wikipedia and if the majority of the users recognize her eligible, she
will become a Wikipedia administrator. In this crowdsourcing task, the requester is the nominator, the worker is the nominee, evaluators are are voters,
the task is evaluating the eligibility of the nominee for adminship in Wikipedia
and contribution is the nominee’s request. For instance, ‘andyl’, a Wikipedia
user nominates ‘cjcurrie’ another user for adminship. 27 users take part in the
election and cast their votes. Finally, ‘cjcurrie’ becomes an administrator in
2 http://wikipedia.org
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Election
Closing
Time
200409-21
01:15:53
200409-21
01:15:53
....
200507-05
00:11:04
200507-05
00:11:04
....

Nominator

Nominee Election Voter
Status ID

Voter
Name

Vote

andyl

cjcurrie 1

3

ludraman 1

andyl

cjcurrie 1

25

blankfaze -1

....
lst27

....
lst27

....
0

....
33

....
....
chmod007 1

lst27

lst27

0

82

xiaopo

0

....

....

....

....

....

....

Time of
Voting
200409-14
16:26:00
200409-14
16:53:00
....
200409-14
22:12:00
200409-16
17:34:00
....

Table 2.1: Example of Wikipedia Adminship Election Log (WIKILog).
Wikipedia as the result of receiving 22 positive, one negative and four neutral
votes (see table 2.1).
We use the interaction log of Wikipedia Adminship Election data3 that are
collected by Leskovec et. al for behavior prediction in online social networks[17],
referred in the following as WIKILog. WIKILog contains about 2,800 elections
with around 100,000 total votes and about 7,000 users participating in the elections either as voter or nominee. We will use the WIKILog in the paper to
demonstrate how it is possible to use the proposed framework to calculate people reputations in crowdsourcing systems. For example, we will show how it is
possible to: (i) calculate pairwise trust between evaluators and workers; (ii) calculate the degree of fairness between evaluators and workers; and (iii) calculate
reputation of the workers. Table 2.1 shows an example of WIKILog data.

2.3

Data Model

We model crowdsourcing entities (mainly evaluators and workers) in a crowdsourcing process log and their relationship as a directed graph G = (V, E) where
V is a set of nodes representing entities and E is a set of directed edges representing relationships between nodes. Following we describe how to: (i) extract
(evaluator and worker) nodes from the crowdsourcing log; (ii) establish relationship between generated nodes; and (ii) calculate the reputation of the people.
These two steps are illustrated in figure 2.1.
Step 1: Preprocessing. The aim of preprocessing of the crowdsourcing log
is to generate a graph by considering the set of workers and evaluators in the log
as nodes of the graph, and the presence of certain relationships between them
encoded as edges between nodes, such as ri is an evaluator of wj , or ri trust wj .
In order to preprocess the WIKILog, we performed the following two steps: (i)
3 http://snap.stanford.edu/data/wiki-Elec.html
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we generate graph nodes (i.e., evaluators and workers)by extracting interactions
and their attributes from the log and formed the set of graph nodes (vertices),
one for each person (but with no relations between nodes); and (ii) we generate
relationship between nodes: we used our previous work [5, 19], to formulate the
relationships between any pairs of nodes in the crowdsourcing log. In particular,
we used correlation condition [19] as a binary predicate defined on the attributes
of graph nodes (evaluators and workers) that allows to identify whether two or
more nodes are potentially related.
Then we used the technique proposed in [5] to establish a pairwise relationship between every evaluator ri and worker wj whose contribution has been
evaluated by ri at least once during system life time. This relation is weighted
by two attributes. The first attribute is a pairwise trust τij which shows in what
extent the ri trusts in the wj . We call this trustworthiness degree Trust Rank.
The second attribute is the degree of fairness ϕij which shows how fair the ri
has been when evaluating the wj .
Step 2: Calculating Reputation Degree. In the second step, using the
pairwise trusts and also degree of fairness values calculated for every pairwise
relation between evaluators and workers up to time n , we calculate a reputation
degree ρ(n) for every worker; here n is the time at which the reputation is
calculated e.g. current time stamp of the system. Every worker’s reputation
is supported by an assigned weight ωj showing how many evidences and trust
ranks have been considered to build that reputation.
We also calculate a Fairness rank γi (n) for every evaluator to show how fair
she has been when evaluating others. The fairness rank is supported by a weight
called weight of fairness and denoted by ψi (n) showing how dependable is the
calculated fairness rank.

3

Pairwise Degree of Fairness

The RMSs must be robust against unfair evaluations and while helping requesters find high quality workers, an RMS must protect workers against unfair
evaluators as well. The proposed credibility model in this section addresses this
problems.
Research shows that in a normal community the majority consensus usually
is dependable and is close enough to experts’ judgments about what is good and
what is bad[7, 20]. Applied to reputation, majority of the evaluators provide
a realistic and dependable evaluation of the performance of a worker. So, we
use the majority consensus as a measure for checking the credibility of the
evaluations provided between pairs of evaluators and workers.
We calculate a degree of fairness for every pairwise relation between evaluators and workers. For example if an evaluator has assessed contributions of n
workers, we will create n degree of fairness relations one for every established
relation. The degree of fairness between ri and wj is denoted by ϕij . Degree
of fairness shows how credible is the trust rank calculated between an evaluator
and a worker. We will use ϕij to show how accurate are the trust feedbacks
that ri has given to wj .
We calculate degree of fairness in four steps. At first, we calculate the average
of all evaluations given to a particular worker, say wj . The equation 3.1 shows
how the average is calculated. The Dj is the set of all evaluators have assessed
8

contributions of wj .
e¯j =

P

l∈Dj

elj (k)

|Dj |

(3.1)

In the second step, we calculate the average of all evaluations given to wj by
ri using the equation 3.2. Nij is the number of evaluations that ri has done on
the trustworthiness of the wj .
e¯ij =

1 X
eij (k)
Nij

(3.2)

In the third step, we calculate the standard deviation of all evaluations given to
a worker as we show in equation 3.3
sP
2
kj − e¯j )
k∈Dj (e¯
(3.3)
SDj =
|Dj |
Finally, we define and calculate degree of fairness of relations between evaluators
and workers regarding the Equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Definition 1 Suppose that the ri has assessed contributions of wj in the time.
The Degree of Fairness between ri and wj shows how fairly ri has evaluated the
contributions of wj and is denoted by ϕij . The ϕij is calculated as follow:

ϕij =





e¯j −SDj −e¯ij
M

1

e¯ij −(e¯j +SDj )
M

if e¯ij < (e¯j − SDj )
if (e¯j − SDj ) ≤ e¯ij ≤ (e¯j + SDj )
if (e¯j + SDj ) < e¯ij

(3.4)

According to Equation 3.4, the averages fall in e¯j ± SDj are trustworthy and
dependable but the averages that fall out of that range are of very low credibility and their impact on reputation are decreased dramatically. The ϕij shows
how close to the majority consensus is the judgment of ri about wj ’s trustworthiness. We use degree of fairness to reduce the effect of evaluations generated
by evaluators who do not agree with the majority consensus.

4

Pairwise Trust

Regarding the analytic model proposed in [12], axioms stated above, defined
constant q and also time label ϑk , we define the trust rank between evaluators
and workers as follows:
Definition 2 Suppose that ~s is the sequence of all evaluations from ri on performance of wj at time instances from the domain D. We define Trust Rank
τij = T (~s), intended to be a measure how much ri trusts wj , as follows:
P
eij (k)q ϑk
P
(4.1)
τij = k∈D
ϑl
l∈D q
Pairwise trust τij is the aggregation of all evaluations received from ri on the
contributions of wj . The aggregation formula given by equation 2 satisfies all
three axioms we propose (see [12] for a proof).
9

Definition 3 Suppose that ~s(n) is the sequence of all evaluations from ri on
performance of wj up to the time instance n. We define Weight of Trust Rank,
intended to be a measure how dependable the calculated trust rank τij is, based
on the evaluations involved in calculation of the trust rank, and denote it by
ωij (n). The value ωij (n) is calculated as follow:
P
q ϑl h(c(i, j, l))
(4.2)
ωij (n) = l∈D
q ϑn
The c(i, j, l) denotes the credit related to the task has been done by wj
and evaluated by ri at time l. Function h is a strictly increasing function that
defines how the c(i, j, l) must be considered in the weight of the trust rank; in
our experiments h(x) = x, i.e., h(c(i, j, l)) = c(i, j, l).
Equation 4.2 counts the number of evaluations that have been used for building trust rank, taking into account their time label. Since we believe that recent
evaluations should have more importance in the system than the older ones, we
accumulate the time weighted number of evaluation rather than simply counting
them.
The other parameter that is important in the weight of the trust rank is the
amount of credit (e.g. money) that has been paid for doing the crowdsourcing
task. Since h(x) is increasing, more credit will lead to more influence on the
resulting weight of the trust rank.

5

Reputation of the Workers

In this section we provide an explicit calculation for obtaining reputation for
every worker. The reputation of a worker is an aggregation of all trust ranks
between the worker and all evaluators with whom she is related, weighted appropriately by the corresponding weight of trust.
Since the reputation is a community wide judgement of trustworthiness of
a worker, we calculate the reputation of workers by aggregating all trust ranks
between the worker and all evaluators who has evaluated her.
Definition 4 Suppose that Dj is the set of all evaluators who have assessed
contributions of wj . We define the Reputation ρj (n) as the community wide
judgement of trustworthiness of wj up to time instance n and calculate it as
follow:
X
ω (n)ϕij
P ij
ρj (n) =
τij
(5.1)
l∈Dj ωlj (n)ϕlj
i∈Dj

Equation 5.1 and Algorithm 1 show that the reputation is an aggregate
of the trust ranks τij that a worker received from all evaluators, prorated by
their corresponding degree of fairness,
P which is reflected in the value of the
corresponding multiplier ωij (n)ϕij / l∈Dj ωlj (n)ϕlj . Such multiplier takes into
account the weight of the
P trust rank wij and the corresponding degree of fairness
ϕij ; the denominator l∈Dj ωlj (n)ϕlj re-normalizes the sum, making ρj (n) a
weighted average of individual trust ranks. This method of calculating trust
ranks reflects our intuition that different evaluators have different credibility
levels which should reflect their overall behavior in the system.
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Algorithm 1 Worker’s Reputation Calculation
Input: T as the set of all pairwise trusts τij , ω as the set of the weight of
all pairwise trust ranks ωij , W as the set of all workers and Φ as the set of
all pairwise degrees of fairness of each evaluator and each worker who was
evaluated by this evaluator at least once.
Output: P as the set of all reputation scores (ρj ) and Ω as their corresponding weights (ωj )
for all w ∈ W do
r=0
w=0
T r ← All Trust ranks on Worker w (Tw ⊂ T )
W t ← Weight of all trust ranks in T rw (W t ⊂ Ω)
Cr ← Credibility of of all trust ranks in T rw (Cr ⊂ Φ)
for all τ ∈ T rw do
wupdate = W tτ ∗ Crτ
r = r + τ ∗ wupdate
w = w + wupdate
end for
Pw = r/w
Ωw = w
end for
return P and Ω
As we stated before, our model distinguishes between the reputations that
are build based on high number of evaluations received from fair evaluators
and reputations build based on few number of evaluations received from unfair
evaluators. This is possible by providing a corresponding weight rank of every
calculated reputation.
Definition 5 Suppose that Dj is the set of all evaluators who have assessed
contributions of wj . We define the Weight of Reputation and denote it by Ωj (n)
to show how dependable is the calculated reputation for wj which is calculated up
to time instance n. We consider the weight and credibility of trust ranks involved
in calculating the reputation to compute its weight. The Ωj (n) is calculate as
follows:
X
ωlj (n)ϕlj
(5.2)
Ωj (n) =
l∈Dj

Equation 5.2 shows that the weight of reputation is calculated by aggregating
weight of trust ranks received from all involved evaluators weighted by the
pairwise degree of fairness between every evaluator and the worker.

6

Fairness of the Evaluators

One of the common problems in existing CS platforms is lack of evaluator
assessment. Evaluators evaluate workers and try to choose workers that generate
high quality contributions but there are no facilities to show how trustworthy
and fair are the evaluators. Sometimes deceptive evaluators evaluate workers
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Algorithm 2 Evaluator’s Fairness Calculation
Input: T as the set of all pairwise trusts τij , ω as the set of the weight of all
pairwise trust ranks ωij , R as the set of all evaluatros and Φ as the set of all
pairwise degrees of fairness between evaluators and workers
Output: Γ as the set of all fairness ranks (γi ) and Ψ as their corresponding
weights (ψi )
for all r ∈ R do
re = 0
wt = 0
T r ← All Trust ranks given by r (T r ⊂ T )
W t ← Weight of all trust ranks in T r (W t ⊂ Ω)
Cr ← Degrees of fairness of of all pairwise relations in T r (Cr ⊂ Φ)
for all τ ∈ T r do
re = re + W tτ ∗ Crτ
wt = wt + W tτ
end for
Γr = re/wt
Ψr = wt
end for
return Γ and Ψ
unfairly and try to cheat and harm them even when they have provided high
quality contributions.
An effective way to prevent evaluators from being unfair is to provide a
community-wide degree of fairness for every evaluator to show how fair the evaluator is. We calculate the fairness of evaluators based on the pairwise degrees
of fairness between the evaluators and workers.
Definition 6 Suppose that Si is the set of all workers who have been involved
in at least one task with the evaluator Ri up to time instance n. We define
the Fairness of Evaluator as the community wide aggregation of the degree of
fairness of the relations of the evaluator with the workers to show how fair the
evaluator has been or is expected to be while working with the workers and denote
it by γi (n). The γi (n) is calculated as follow:
P
j∈S ωij (n)ϕij
(6.1)
γi (n) = P i
l∈Si ωil (n)
To show the community how dependable is the calculated fairness, we provide a weight along with every fairness rank calculated for the evaluator.

Definition 7 Suppose that Si is the set of all workers who have been involved
in at least one task with the evaluator Ri up to time instance n. We define the
Weight of Fairness to show how dependable the fairness rank calculated for the
Ri is and denote it by ψi (n). The ψi (n) is calculated as follow:
X
ωil (n)
(6.2)
ψi (n) =
l∈Si
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The ψi (n) is built out of the weights of all pairwise degree of fairness relations
between the evaluator and the workers. The weight of fairness in fact counts the
number of workers that has been involved in crowdsourcing tasks with the Ri
weighted by the weight of pairwise trust rank between them. Algorithm 2 shows
how the fairness of the requester and its corresponding weight are calculated.

7

Implementation and Evaluation

7.1

Implementation

We implemented our model using Java as the programming language and IBM
DB2 as the database manager. We have used the WIKILog introduced in Section
2.2 as the dataset for model evaluation. To make the data match the model we
suppose that all tasks have the same credit equal to one. All the elections have
happened between 2004 and 2008. To define ϑk , we have divided the time period
to half year time intervals. So, the evaluations have the time labels from one
to eight. We also supposed that half life of the importance of evaluations is
one √
year, so we have chosen the half life t = 2, which, by equation (2.1) gives
q = 2.
To evaluate our model, we compare it with two popular reputation calculation models. The first one is normal averaging model which is widely used
in existing CS systems. The models used in Amazon1 , ebay R 2 , and lots of
other online communities or markets use normal averaging. In normal averaging model reputation is the average of all votes casted on the quality of he
worker’s contributions. The second model is adaptive averaging model in which
the votes casted by people are weighted by their reputation and then employed
to calculate the reputation of the worker. The Google Pagerank model[21],
EigenTrust [14] and our previous work [12] are samples of adaptive averaging
model. We have chosen Pagerank as the base of all these reputation models to
compare with our model.

7.2

Experimentation and Evaluation

In order to evaluate the model robustness against unfair evaluations, in the first
step we applied all three models to WIKILog and calculated a reputation rank
for every worker in every model. Then, we added some noises to the dataset to
check robustness of the models against unfair evaluations.
To add noises we added 20 percent unfair votes on all workers. To check the
credibility of models we tried to manipulate reputation of people by supporting
all untrustworthy people (workers with normal average reputation less than 2)
by adding votes with value of 3. We also attacked all trustworthy workers
(workers with normal average reputation greater or equal than 2) by adding
votes with value of 1. Then we calculated the reputations again and calculated
the percentage of changes happened in the reputation of the workers. figure
7.1(a) shows how the reputation of the workers have changed after adding noises
to the dataset. The horizontal axis of the chart is the percentage of changes
1 http://www.amazon.com
2 http://www.ebay.com
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Figure 7.1: Changes happened in reputations in three models
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Figure 7.2: Reputations ranks before and after adding noise to dataset in three
models
happened in the reputation of the workers and the vertical axis is the percentage
of the workers who has that amount of the changes in their reputation.
As shown in figure 7.1(a), 82.5 percent of the workers in our model experienced changes less than 10% in their reputation; the corresponding fraction
of users whose reputation rank changed less than 10% is only 63.1% for eBay
model and 41.8% for the page rank model. So, in comparison with eBay and
pagerank models, our model is more robust against manipulations in reputation
by unfair evaluations.
Figures 7.1(b) to 7.1(d) show the distribution of changes in the reputation of
the workers in these three models. We note that there are some users whose reputations in our model have not changed but in others have. To better compare
the changes, we have chosen just 262 persons whose reputations in our model
has changed and compared it with other models. As shown in figure 7.1(b) the
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User
ID

User
Name

1
2
....
948
....
1038
....

taoster
anthony
....
borisblue
....
elonka
....

Our Model

Reputation
0.25
1.0
....
2.96
....
2.91
....

Weight
2.0
0.1250
....
1.032
....
19.123
....

ebay
Reputation

Pagerank
Reputation

2.0
1.0
....
2.66
....
2.76
....

3.0
1.5
....
2.99
....
2.92
....

Table 7.1: Samples of Calculated Reputations.
changes in our model are distributed with an average of 0.167 and a standard
deviation of 0.21. The average and the standard deviation for eBay model are
0.261 and 0.061 (figure 7.1(c)) and 0.464 and 0.319 for pagerank, respectively
(figure 7.1(d)). This implies that changes in the reputation of the workers in
our model are mostly in range of [0, 0.377] (the average change of 0.167 plus
one standard deviation of 0.21). For ebay most of the changes fall in the range
of [2.0, 0.322] (average of 0.261) and finally for the pagerank in the range of
[0.145, 0.783] (average of 0.464). This shows that the average change in reputation of the workers due to such attack is in our model significantly lower than
in the other two; thus, our model is more robust against unfair evaluations.
The Figure 7.2 also display a comparative view of changes happened in the
reputation of the workers after inserting 20% noise to the dataset. As it is
obvious from the figure, most of the workers has reputation ranks of the value
more than 2, thus most of the workers have been attacked by noises. Figure
7.2(a), shows the reputations calculated based on our model, Figure 7.2(b) is
related to ebay model and Figure 7.2(c) is related to the pagerank model. The
figures illustrate that the difference between the two reputation ranks calculated
for users in our model is less than the other two models.
Our model also provides weights for calculated reputations. As shown in
table 7.1, the reputations calculated in ebay and pagerank models (and consequently all other similar models like Amazon and EigenTrust) are just one scalar
value and it is very hard to judge the credibility of such calculated reputation,
or to compare two reputation ranks just using their values. For our model the
story is different. Every reputation comes with a corresponding weight showing
the credibility of such reputation. This makes it easier and much more reliable to compare workers even when they have similar reputations. For example
reputation of ‘borisblue’ in table 7.1 is 2.96 and higher than reputation of the
‘elonka’ which is 2.91. In terms of reputation values, ‘borisblue’ is more trustworthy than ‘elonka’ but by looking at the corresponding weights of reputations
we realize that we can trust ‘elonka’ more than ‘borisblue’ because the weight
of reputation of ‘borisblue’, equal to 1.032, is more than eighteen times smaller
than the weight of reputation of ‘elonka’ which is 19.123. Thus, the reputation
rank of ‘elonka’ is far more credible than the reputation rank of ‘borisblue’,
making ’elonika’ a preferred worker, despite its lower reputation. Thus, anno-
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Figure 7.3: The schematic view of calculated Degrees of fairness
tating reputation with a corresponding weight which indicates the credibility
of such rank helps minimize the risk of choosing workers sub-optimally due to
unreliable reputation ranks.
The descriptive nature of reputation ranks illustrated in Table 7.1 is also
applicable to the calculated fairness ranks. The Figure 7.3 schematically shows
how fairness ranks of the evaluators can be compared in a 3D comparison chart.
The fairness ranks are characterized by their value, their corresponding wight
and the owner of the rank. Only 10 evaluators are chosen to display in the
Figure 7.3 because showing all evaluators will decreases the readability of the
chart while does not increase any added value. By Figure 7.3 we just intend
to show ho informative are fairness ranks while are supported by wights in
comparison with just presenting them as ordinal values.
In Figure 7.3, R7 has the degree of fairness of 0.1 with the weight of 1.0.
It mean that although R7 has a low fairness rank but we can not be sure that
she is that unfair, because we do not have enough evidences for that. R9 has
fairness rank of 0.9 with the weight of 160.019, thus we are sure that she is not a
fair evaluator. On the other hand, R8 has fairness rank of0.742 with the weight
of 103.77, so she is almost a fair evaluator. The R6 has fairness rank of value
1.0 which is the highest possible rank, but we do not have enough supporting
evidences to argue that she is a fair evaluator since the weight of her fairness
rank is 0.177.

8

Related Work

There are two categories of studies related to our research.

8.1

Crowd enhanced platforms

The Amazon Mechanical Turk is a general-purpose online marketplace suitable
for doing simple crowdsourcing tasks called Human Intelligence Task (HIT).
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There is no any metric called reputation in MTurk but there are some other
metrics showing the trustworthiness of the workers like percentage of accepted
or submitted HITS. There are no mechanisms in MTurk for detecting unfair
evaluations and workers are highly vulnerable against misbehavior.
eBay is another crowd enhanced system in which the people sell and buy
goods. People evaluate each other when they involve in transactions and based
on these feedbacks, a reputation is built for the person as a seller or buyer or
both. As we shown here, ebay reputation model is also vulnerable against unfair
evaluations.
StackOverflow1 is a question and answering web site. Users in StackOverflow
can ask their questions, answer to questions asked by others and vote on the
quality of the questions asked or answers provided by other community members. regarding received votes, a reputation is calculated for every member.
There are no means for identifying unfair contributions in StackOverflow and
users can easily manipulate reputations calculated for workers.

8.2

Research Tools and Prototypes

Noor and Sheng [20] have proposed a trust management framework for cloud
environments but it is very similar to reputation concept in crowdsourcing era
and their idea is close to our work. They propose a credibility model for identifying unfair evaluations by using the concept of majority. They calculate an
experience degree for every consumer evaluating services and apply it to the aggregation of his votes to eliminate votes form dishonest evaluators. The problem
is that people sometimes are fair with most of the people while they are unfair
just with a few number of people. In this case the unfairness of the evaluator
will not be detected due to large number of fair votes. The other problem with
Noor et.al model is that time and credit are not considered in calculation of
trust and also experience of the customer.
Pagerank[21] is one of the most popular reputation management algorithms
which employs the reputation of the evaluator in calculating the reputation of
a worker. The votes given by highly reputable people are more important than
votes of low reputable workers in pagerank model. This model is used by Google
to rank pages in the internet. As we have shown in this work, pagerank does not
employ any means for identifying unfair evaluations and is weak against unfair
evaluation attacks. It also does not consider time in the reputation calculations.
EigenTrust[14] is a popular trust model which is built based on the pagerank
algorithm and tried to solve the problem of unfair evaluations. EigenTrust
supposes that there are some pre-trusted users in the system in which we can
trust and it is evident that this assumption is not applicable to most of the
existing crowdsourcing systems like question and answering systems or online
marketplaces. It is also proven that EigenTrust is not robust against unfair
evaluations[18].

9

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper we have proposed a model for reputation management in crowdsourcing environments. We have introduced an analytic model for calculating a
1 http://stackoverflow.com
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more accurate, realistic and reliable reputation rank of workers by taking into
account the time, the credit amount and more importantly the credibility of the
evaluators. We have also proposed a model for calculating a reputation for assessing how fair an evaluator in evaluating the contributions of the workers. We
use this degree of fairness to distinguish the honest evaluators from dishonest
ones who cast unfair votes. We have validated our model using experimental
evaluations and compared the accuracy and credibility of our model with eBay
and pagerank models. The results presented show that our model is more robust
against manipulating the reputation of workers by unfair evaluations than two
commonly used methods (eBay and Pagerank).
In the real world workers are involved in many crowdsourcing tasks, and
our method very effectively utilizes this fact to make it harder to manipulate
worker’s reputation by dishonest and unfair evaluations. The more activities
the worker has, the more evaluations are needed to create a major change in
her reputation. So, the experienced users that have lots of activities will benefit
from more robust and realistic reputation scores.
For the novice workers or workers with few activities, because of the small
number of evaluations that build up their reputation scores, it is easier to change
the worker’s reputation by unfair evaluations; however, when the overall number
of the activities of the user increases in time, those unfair evaluations will be
detected and gradually the reputation of the worker will be corrected and unfair
evaluations will be essentially ignored by our method for calculating reputation
of workers.
As future work, we plan to extend our model to identify colluding groups
and protect workers against badmouthing and ballot stuffing. We are in the
process of building a flexible people evaluation tool based on our model which
can be seamlessly integrated with the existing crowdsourcing platforms.
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